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Abstract 
Long-term unemployment reached unprecedented levels in Spain in the wake of the Great 
Recession and it still affects around 57% of the unemployed. We document the sources that 
contributed to the rise in long-term unemployment and analyze its persistence using state-of-
the-art duration models. We find pervasive evidence of negative duration dependence, while 
personal characteristics such as mature age, lack of experience, and entitlement to 
unemployment benefits are key to understand the cross-sectional differences in the incidence 
of long-term unemployment. The negative impact of low levels of skills and education is 
muted by the large share of temporary contracts, but once we restrict attention to employment 
spells lasting at least one month these factors also contribute to a higher risk of long-term 
unemployment. Surprisingly, workers from the construction sector do not fare worse than 
similar workers from other sectors. Finally, self-reported reservation wages are found to 
respond strongly to the cycle, but much less to individual unemployment duration. In view of 
these findings, we argue that active labour market policies should play a more prominent role 
in the fight against long-term unemployment while early activation should be used to curb 
inflows. 
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, long-term unemployment reached unprece-
dented levels in Spain. At the worst moment during the crisis, 16% of the labor force
and nearly two out of three (64%) unemployed persons had been searching for a job for
over a year. Since that time, the situation in the labor market has improved consider-
ably, with employment growing at a rate of around 2.3% per yerar since 2014, but the
share of long-term unemployed is still 57%, while the share of unemployed with spells
above two years is 42%.
The high incidence of long-term unemployment (LTU) entails a risk for social co-
hesion and it poses enormous challenges for policymakers. The probability of an exit
from unemployment tends to fall with duration due to factors such as skill deprecia-
tion, loss of motivation, and discrimination on the part of employers. Moreover, health
problems due to mental stress, the accumulation of debt or housing problems also tend
to increase over time.1 Reenfranchising the long-term unemployed therefore becomes
progressively harder,2 which creates a risk of social exclusion for the individual and of
high structural unemployment for society at large. This state of aﬀairs motivates our
work. We start by documenting the factors that have contributed to the buildup of
LTU and we subsequently perform an econometric analysis to quantify the impact of
individual and aggregate determinants on the probability that an individual enters and
exits LTU. The main objectives of our econometric analysis are to isolate the impact of
unemployment duration on job-finding rates and to identify the population groups that
are most vulnerable. Our empirical approach delivers reduced-form estimates, result-
ing from the interplay of labor demand and supply decisions, and hence do not have a
causal interpretation. For this reason we also analyze the response of self-reported reser-
vation wages to both unemployment duration and changes in aggregate labor market
conditions.
The factors that account for the dismal performance of the Spanish labor market
are well-known. Like many other European countries, Spain suﬀered two consecutive
recessions, the 2008 international financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, but in the
Spanish case these external shocks were compounded by the bursting of a housing bub-
ble and a large-scale banking crisis that led to a severe reduction in bank lending to
firms (Jimeno and Santos 2014, Bentolila et al. 2016). The collapse of the construction
sector alone added 1.7 million, mostly low-educated, workers to the ranks of the unem-
ployed. Furthermore, all these shocks interacted with institutional factors, such as the
dual nature of the Spanish labor market and a rigid system of collective bargaining,
that resulted in high worker-turnover due to the massive destruction of temporary jobs
and a slow adjustment of negotiated wages.3 Here we take the shocks to the Spanish
1See Farré et al. (2015) for evidence on Spain and Winter-Ebmer (2016) for other countries.
2Hence the title of this article, which is inspired by Saint-Paul (1996).
3From 2010 to 2012, three consecutive labor market reforms introduced profound changes in the
system collective bargaining but failed to address the problem of duality, see Bentolila et al. (2012)
and García-Pérez and Jansen (2015).
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economy as given and pursue an analysis of the mechanisms that generate the high
degree of unemployment persistence that has fueled the buildup of LTU.
Our descriptive analysis in Section 3 is based on data from the Spanish Labor
Force Survey. It reveals that LTU especially aﬀects older and less educated workers.
Nonetheless, even for prime-age male workers we obtain we obtain an LTU share close
to 60%. Moreover, inspection of longitudinal data indicates a strong negative relation-
ship between the average transition rate from unemployment to employment and the
duration of the unemployment spells. A key objective of our empirical analysis is to
assess to what degree this negative correlation reflects genuine duration dependence.
This question is important because the same negative correlation could be the outcome
of endogenous changes in the composition of the pool of unemployed due to dynamic
selection. In the first case the low job-finding probabilities of the long-term unemployed
are mainly a reflection of a lack of labor demand, while the alternative explanation of
dynamic selection would point at the importance of supply-side factors, such as inade-
quate skills, that result in low job-finding rates from the very start of the unemployment
spell.
In order to avoid the potentially confounding role of changes in worker characteris-
tics, in Section 4 we estimate state-of-the-art duration models. To account for selection,
we estimate similar models for the outflow from both employment and unemployment,
and we allow for worker unobserved heterogeneity. To take into account the dual nature
of the Spanish labor market, we model flows to and from temporary and permanent
jobs. And, lastly, to properly capture the impact of the unemployment benefit system,
we use workers’ full employment history to measure their entitlement to contributory
benefits. Most of these refinements are absent from the recent literature on long-term
unemployment, as described in Section 2.
The estimation is performed using the Continuous Sample of Working Lives, which
is a large sample of Social Security records. This data set allows us to capture short-
term worker flows which are mostly missed by the LFS. On the other hand, this source
does not allow us to distinguish between unemployment and nonparticipation, though
we show that this is probably not an important shortcoming. In view of the fact that
in Spain –like in other countries– the Great Recession reduced male significantly more
than female employment, as well as to avoid standard sources of estimation bias, we
limit our analysis to the population of native prime-age males.4
Our empirical results indicate that in Spain the conditional probability of entering
LTU is very large and is significantly raised by receipt of unemployment benefits, mature
age, low experience, and –especially once we mitigate the relevance of spells of less than
one month– low education and low skill. In agreement with the recent literature on
LTU in the US, we also find that duration dependence and not dynamic selection is the
primary source of the low job-finding rates of the long-term unemployed.
Temporary contracts help to reduce the risk of LTU conditional on unemployment,
4The term “mancession” was named in The New York Times one of the buzzwords of 2009 (Leibovich
and Barret 2009). Bentolila et al. (2017) presents evidence on female long-term unemployment in
Spain.
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but they also cause huge inflows into unemployment. For this reason, it is natural to ask
whether temporary contracts are indeed a useful work-sharing arrangement during a
crisis. A related question is whether short-duration contracts or placements have a no-
ticeable impact on the subsequent employment prospects of the long-term unemployed
or whether employers ignore these spells when assessing prospective employees. Here we
take a first step towards answering the latter question by considering a model in which
exits to spells lasting less than 30 days are treated as censored. Our estimates indicate
that temporary jobs especially help specific groups of workers to leave unemployment,
namely the least educated and experienced ones.
In Section 5 we conduct an exploratory analysis of reservation wages during the
Great Recession with a diﬀerent data source, the Spanish Survey of Family Finances.
We find that self-reported reservation wages strongly adjust with the aggregate business
cycle and also, though much less, with individual unemployment duration. In Section
6 we summarize our findings and argue that higher aggregate demand alone will not
solve the LTU problem. Since Spain has a totally inadequate institutional setup to deal
with LTU, expanding and, especially, improving active labor market policies, linking
them to the receipt of unemployment benefits, and intensifying early activation, would
be helpful measures. The Appendix includes further empirical results.
2 Literature review
Our work adds to a long literature on long-term unemployment in Europe. Overviews
of work in this area as of the 1990s appear in Layard et al. (1991) and Machin and
Manning (1999). Thereafter the incidence of LTU started to fall and so did the volume
of academic work on this issue. However, the rise of LTU in the US in the aftermath
of the Great Recession sparked an intense debate on the driving forces behind this
phenomenon. In spite of their varying approaches, a common finding from existing
studies is that the low exit rates of the long-term unemployed are due to negative
duration dependence. On the contrary, changes in the pool of the unemployed due to
dynamic selection play at best a modest role. Let us briefly review the literature that
is closer to our analysis.
In a seminal study, Kroft et al. (2016) construct an augmented matching model to
assess the relative role of composition eﬀects, duration dependence, and transitions into
nonparticipation in the buildup of LTU and the outward shift of the Beveridge curve
in the US. These authors back out duration dependence from observed transition rates
and show that it is one of the dominant forces at work, together with cyclical changes
in nonparticipation.
In a related study, Krueger et al. (2014) analyze the role of unemployment duration
on wages, reemployment chances, and labor force withdrawal. The structure of their
paper is similar to ours, but these authors use logistic models to analyse how transition
rates to employment and nonparticipation vary with duration. Unlike our case, the
authors use data that allow a distinction between unemployment and nonparticipation,
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but the logistic models that they use do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, a
shortcoming which could significantly bias the estimates of duration dependence.
Our work is closest in spirit to Abraham et al. (2016), who use matched firm-worker
data to estimate the impact of unemployment duration on subsequent employment out-
comes. Their estimation technique compares the diﬀerence in pre- and post-employment
shares for unemployed workers in seven diﬀerent duration categories. This procedure
allows the authors to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and for diﬀer-
ences in prior employment. Nonetheless, there are relevant diﬀerences with our work.
While we observe the entire working history of the individuals in our sample, Abraham
et al. (2016) only consider the employment outcomes eight quarters before and after
the measurement of unemployment. Moreover, their estimation technique is essentially
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator, while we use a duration model.
As stated in the Introduction, in our analysis we adapt duration estimation methods
to address some of the problems that have been found in the previous literature, deal-
ing as best we can with unobserved heterogeneity, state dependence, and self-selection.
Recent work on LTU in the US does not treat the problem of selection into unem-
ployment. In contrast we do so, by estimating a duration model for the probability
of entering unemployment from employment, which depends on worker observed and
unobserved characteristics. Since these characteristics also determine the probability
of leaving unemployment, we estimate both duration models jointly.
We choose to employ duration models for two reasons. First, we have censored
spells, for both employment and unemployment. Censoring cannot be dealt with using
linear probability models, but ignoring censoring can lead to bias, since then the error
term does not satisfy the standard properties in a regression model. Second, we wish
to control for explanatory variables that change with duration, unemployment bene-
fits in particular. To this end we need a duration model that takes into account the
individual situation each month. In this vein, our study also belongs in the literature
on the estimation of the determinants of the probability of leaving employment and
unemployment.5
Lastly, here we also pay close attention to the dual structure of the labor market.
Studying LTU in a dual labor market raises some interesting issues for understanding
the determinants of long-term unemployment that, to the best of our knowledge, have
not been addressed yet in the European literature.
3 The legacy of the Great Recession
In this section we provide several pieces of descriptive evidence on the nature of LTU
in Spain based on the Labor Force Statistics (LFS). We begin by showing the unprece-
5For Spain, see for example García-Pérez (1997), Bover et al. (2002), Bover and Gómez (2004),
García-Perez and Muñoz-Bullón (2011), Arranz et al. (2010), Arranz and García-Serrano (2014),
Carrasco and García-Pérez (2015), and Nagore and van Soest (2016b). Our work here especially
builds on Rebollo and García-Pérez (2015).
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Figure 1: Duration-speciﬁc unemployment rates in Spain, 1976Q3-2016Q3 (% of labor
force)
Note: Recessions are shaded. Sources: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa and, for
recession dates, Spanish Economic Association, Spanish Business Cycle Dating Com-
mittee.
dented increase in LTU as a result of the Great Recession, we then discuss the incidence
of LTU for diﬀerent population groups, and we end with a review of the evolution of
the main labor market ﬂows during the crisis. Our discussion of the ﬂows includes
preliminary evidence on the existence of duration dependence and highlights the thin
line between unemployment and nonparticipation.
3.1 The unprecedented rise in LTU
Figure 1 plots unemployment rates by duration, expressed as a share of the labor force,
for the period between 1976 and 2016. The three lines represent, respectively, short-
term unemployment (STU, up to one year), long-term unemployment between up to
two years, and very long-term unemployment (VLTU), which refers to spells of two
or more years. The shaded bars indicate recessions. Their purpose is to highlight the
cumulative eﬀect of the two recent recessionary periods, the ﬁrst one unleashed by the
ﬁnancial crisis in the US after the fall of Lehman Brothers and the second one caused
by the Eurozone crisis.
Inspection of Figure 1 shows that all three duration-speciﬁc unemployment rates
reached record levels at distinct moments during the crisis. While STU peaked at
the onset of the ﬁrst recession, LTU continued to grow until the end of the second
recession and VLTU peaked even later. At its peak, 10.6% of the Spanish labor force
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Figure 2: Long-term unemployment before and after the Great Recession in selected
EU countries, 2007 and 2015 (% of labor force)
Source: OECD.Stat, Annual Labour Force Statistics.
was unemployed for more than two years. Since that time, the incidence of VLTU has
dropped to a level of 7.9% in 2016Q3, but almost two-thirds of the people remaining in
this group (63.4%) have been unemployed for at least four years.
The levels of LTU are not only striking from a historical perspective. Spain also
stands out internationally, as is shown in Figure 2. In 2015, its LTU rate (11.4%) was
the second-highest in the EU, exceeding the EU average by almost 7 percentage points.6
Interestingly, four out of the six EU member states with the highest LTU rates partic-
ipated in an EU-sponsored bailout program. This evidence points at the importance
of the deep and prolonged contraction of aggregate demand in these countries as one
of the main drivers of the rise in LTU. Moreover, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain
–as well as France– are countries with dual labor markets that entered the crisis with
a rigid system of collective bargaining. These institutional features and the resulting
delay in wage adjustment also seem to have played an essential role in the buildup of
LTU in these countries (Bentolila and Jansen 2016).
Next, returning to the case of Spain, we observe a considerable degree of cross-
sectional variation in the incidence of LTU. In most cases there exists a strong corre-
lation between the rise in STU and LTU by demographic group. However, changes in
nonparticipation and shifts in the distribution of labor demand also play a role. By way
6Notice that Eurostat reports lower ﬁgures for the incidence of LTU than the Spanish Statistical
Institute (INE), as it uses a diﬀerent deﬁnition. Eurostat measures the length of unemployment spells
as the period since the end of a person’s last job. INE, on the contrary, exploits information on search
duration.
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of illustration, Table 1 provides a breakdown of the changes in labor force participa-
tion, employment, and unemployment for diﬀerent worker characteristics. Besides the
standard unemployment rate, the table also reports cohort-specific LTU shares. The
latter are defined as the proportion of long-term unemployed among the unemployed
in each group. The LTU shares provide a proxy for the conditional probability that an
unemployed worker in each of the groups ends up in LTU.
The reported data confirm a number of well-known facts. The drop in employment
rates aﬀected men more than women, and was strongly concentrated among youth,
low-educated workers with at most mandatory education, and immigrants. In 2016
the same cohorts also present the highest LTU rates as a share of the labor force (not
shown),7 but in the cases of youth and immigrants these high LTU rates are mostly
driven by the relatively high inflow into unemployment. Indeed, both groups of workers
have below-average LTU shares. While 59.8% of the unemployed in our reference period
were long-term unemployed, this figure is reduced to 40.2% in the case of youth and
to 55.9% for non-natives. On the contrary, LTU shares are all close to 60% for the
remaining demographic groups. This uniformity is a striking finding that highlights the
widespread nature of LTU in Spain. College education seems to provide some protection
against the risk of LTU, but the diﬀerence between the LTU share of college-educated
workers and those with at most primary education is equal to only 8 percentage points
(pp). Similarly, even for prime-age workers we obtain an LTU share of 59%.
Finally, older unemployed workers clearly seem to be the most vulnerable group.
They face a relatively low risk of unemployment, but more than two-thirds of the
unemployed in the age bracket from 45 to 54 years old are long-term unemployed, and for
those who are 55 and older this share is a staggering 77.6%. Given these comparatively
high LTU shares, one might have expected a rise in nonparticipation for this group,
but the reverse is true. Between 2007 and 2016 the labor force participation rate of
the oldest cohort increased by 10.3 pp from 45 to 55.3%. Some part of the increase in
the LTU rate of the oldest workers may therefore be driven by a drop in the transition
rate to nonparticipation. Two other cohorts for which we observe marked changes in
participation rates during the crisis are youth and women. In our econometric analysis
below we avoid the potentially confounding role of these changes in participation rates
by restricting the analysis to males aged 25 to 54 years old.
3.2 The role of mismatch and composition eﬀects
Apart from the drop in aggregate labor demand, the economic crisis has also induced
profound shifts in the relative demand for skills and the distribution of employment by
industry. The two major shifts are the fall in the demand for low-educated workers and
the collapse of the construction sector. In 2007 the construction sector accounted for
13% of total employment and nine years later this share had fallen to 6%. In absolute
terms, the collapse of the construction sector caused a maximum loss of 1.74 million,
7Notice that cohort-specific LTU rates can be computed as the product of cohort-specific unem-
ployment rates and LTU shares.
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mostly low-skilled jobs during the crisis, but this is not the whole picture.8 From peak
to through Spain lost three million jobs that were previously occupied by workers with
no more than compulsory education. Moreover, the sharp drop in the employment of
low-educated workers contrasts with a slight increase in the employment of university
graduates.
A straightforward procedure to illustrate the degree of mismatch between the de-
mand and supply of labor and to gauge its importance for the buildup of LTU is to
compare the characteristics of the pool of employed and unemployed workers. The for-
mer provides an approximation to labor demand while the composition of the pool of
unemployed workers provides a proxy for the characteristics of labor supply. Once again
we distinguish between STU, LTU, and VLTU. Moreover, in addition to the personal
characteristics listed before, in Table 2 we also provide a breakdown by the industry of
the unemployed workers’ previous occupation. This decomposition, unavailable from
the LFS, is computed from the administrative records of the Muestra Continua de Vidas
Laborales (see Section 4.2), while the rest of the data are computed using data from
the Spanish LFS.
Our main interest concerns the groups of workers that are more prominent among
the unemployed than among the employed. Careful inspection of the data shows that
this is the case for youth, immigrants, low-educated individuals –i.e., those without
completed upper-secondary education– and workers from the construction sector. For
the latter two groups the degree of mismatch is increasing roughly monotonically with
unemployment duration, while the opposite is true for youth and immigrants. For
example, the construction sector currently accounts for 6.1% of employment and the
workers from this sector represent 11.3% of the short-term unemployed and 19.3% of
the very long-term unemployed, while the corresponding figures for individuals with
primary education are, respectively, 6.6%, 12.4%, and 16.4%. The individuals who
belong to these two groups therefore face both an above-average probability of entering
unemployment and a comparatively high conditional probability of ending up in VLTU.
By contrast, youth and immigrants enter unemployment more frequently than the
average worker, but they also exit unemployment more quickly. The latter explains
why their share in the pool of unemployed is negatively related to duration. Finally,
workers above 45 years of age make up a comparatively small share of the short-run
unemployed and a comparatively large share of the long-term unemployed, and this
share is increasing with duration. In other words, relatively few older workers become
unemployed, but those who do so face a high conditional probability of ending up in
VLTU.
The relatively strong concentration of disadvantaged workers among the unemployed
with spells longer than two years poses a challenge to policymakers. Our analysis below
indicates that these workers have very low job-finding rates, which have barely improved
in recent times. Nonetheless, the contribution of composition eﬀects to the buildup of
8This calculation is based on data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and takes 2008Q1 as the
reference period. The breakdown of employment by industry is not consistent before this date.
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Table 2: Employment and unemployment breakdown by duration and population group
in Spain, 2016Q2 (%)
Unemployed
Very
Employed Short-term Long-term long-term
Gender
Male 54.5 51.3 45.8 48.5
Female 45.5 48.7 54.2 51.5
Age
16-24 years old 4.4 22.5 18.4 7.0
25-34 years old 20.7 26.0 27.4 20.8
35-44 years old 31.9 26.1 23.7 25.8
45-54 years old 27.5 18.3 19.9 28.2
55-64 years old 15.5 7.0 10.6 18.2
Education
Primary 6.6 12.4 12.5 16.4
Secondary, 1st stage 27.4 37.6 37.2 42.6
Secondary, 2nd stage 23.9 26.1 23.3 21.5
College 42.1 23.8 26.9 19.5
Industry of previous job
Primary 4.1 0.1 3.6 3.0
Manufacturing 14.0 8.6 9.7 13.5
Construction 6.1 11.3 9.2 19.3
Wholesale and retail trade 16.6 16.3 16.4 14.5
Finance and real state 3.1 1.5 1.9 1.7
Professional and business services 20.5 24.7 19.0 20.5
Education 6.7 3.5 4.1 3.0
Health care 8.1 5.5 5.4 4.6
Leisure and hospitality 7.8 16.5 13.1 4.4
Scientists, artists and other 13.0 12.0 17.6 15.5
Note: The breakdown by industry corresponds to 2015. Columns add up to 100 by
characteristic. Sources: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa and for industry breakdown
Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, Encuesta Continua de Vidas Laborales. Short-
term denotes unemploment for up to one year, long-term between one and two years,
and very-long term for more than two years.
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the current stock of long-term unemployed seems to have been modest compared to the
contribution of the strong rise in the disaggregated LTU shares for most cohorts. In
Bentolila et al. (2017) we construct a counterfactual series for the overall LTU share
in which the weights of diﬀerent groups (formed by crossing age, gender, education,
and nationality) in unemployment are allowed to change in accordance with the actual
data, while the group-specific LTU shares are fixed at their pre-crisis values in 2008Q3.
By construction, the counterfactual LTU shares for the reference period coincide with
the pre-crisis minimum of the actual LTU shares. While this is a rough exercise that
excludes the role of time-varying industry shares, it is telling that it indicates that
composition eﬀects account for only 10% of the increase in the LTU share from 2008Q3
to 2016Q2.
3.3 Labor market flows during the crisis
In the previous sections we have provided evidence on the evolution of the stocks of
employed (E), unemployed (U), and non-participating (N) workers. The purpose of
this section is to describe the evolution of the flows among these states. To be consis-
tent with the empirical analysis in the next section, we distinguish between permanent
and temporary jobs and we restrict our sample to male prime-age workers (25-54 years
old). We use aggregates constructed from LFS longitudinal panel data using popula-
tion weights and measured as three-quarter centered moving averages, so as to reduce
seasonal volatility.
We begin with the initial impulse to the rise in unemployment, i.e. the increase in
the transition rates between employment and unemployment at the onset of the two
recent recessions. In the left-hand panel of Figure 3 we observe a sharp increase in the
termination of temporary jobs at the start of the first recession and another jump in the
second recession. The spikes in dismissals of permanent workers are even more apparent
in the right-hand panel, though it should be noted that the separation rate of permanent
jobs is almost a factor of magnitude smaller than the one for temporary jobs. Overall,
between 2008 and 2013, the quarterly transition rate between temporary employment
and unemployment more than doubled –and even today it is still substantially higher
than in 2008. By contrast, the transition rate between permanent employment and
unemployment is currently close to its pre-crisis level.
Our next figure depicts the transition rates in the opposite direction, namely be-
tween unemployment and employment, on either permanent or temporary jobs. Both
transition rates fell dramatically during the crisis and are still far below their pre-crisis
levels. In the case of temporary jobs the average quarterly transition rate fell by almost
20 pp, from a pre-crisis level of around 32% to a minimum of 12%, and its current level
lies around 17%. The quarterly transition rate between unemployment and permanent
employment follows a similar pattern, but once again the rates are almost an order of
magnitude smaller than in the case of temporary employment. Before the crisis, around
5% of unemployed males managed to transit from unemployment to a permanent job
within a quarter, while currently only close to 2% do. The above-mentioned rates are
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Figure 3: Quarterly ﬂow rates into unemployment by contract type in Spain, 2005Q3-
2016Q2 (%)
Note: Rates are computed with respect to the reference population in the preceding
quarter. Source: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa.
Figure 4: Quarterly ﬂow rates into employment by contract type in Spain, 2005Q3-
2016Q2 (%)
Note: Rates are computed with respect to the reference population in the preceding
quarter. Source: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa.
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Figure 5: Unemployment duration-speciﬁc transitions to employment in Spain, 2006Q1-
2016Q1 (%)
Source: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa.
averages and do not account for changes in the pool of unemployed, but they provide
an indication of the dramatic increase in the average length of unemployment spells
and thereby the risk of LTU during the crisis.
In view of our focus on LTU, it is also worth checking whether the ﬂow rate from
unemployment to employment falls with duration. To this aim, Figure 5 represents
quarterly exit rates to employment according to the duration of unemployment. There
is a clear gradient, with the exit rate falling with the spell length. And the diﬀerences are
huge: at the end of the expansion around 37% of workers who had been unemployed
for up to 6 months left within a quarter, whereas only 14% of those who had been
unemployed for 4 years or more did so. During the recession all exit rates fell, but
diﬀerences across duration groups shrank signiﬁcantly. Then, when the recovery arrived,
diﬀerences widened again, with the exit rates of the long-term unemployed increasing
by less than those of the short-term unemployed, a situation which has reinforced their
chances of remaining stuck in unemployment. This is prima facie evidence of the
presence of duration dependence, but at this stage we cannot exclude the alternative
explanation of dynamic selection. Namely, that over time the composition of the pool of
the unemployed may worsen as the most employable workers leave ﬁrst and this process
of selection also generates a negative relationship between the average job-ﬁnding rate
and duration. We address this issue rigorously in Section 4.
The foregoing evidence highlights the dramatic changes that took place during the
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Figure 6: Quarterly ﬂows to/from unemployment in Spain, 2005Q3-2016Q1 (persons)
Note: E, employment; U, unemployment; and N, nonparticipation. Source: INE, En-
cuesta de Población Activa.
crisis in the ﬂows between employment and unemployment. It also reveals the over-
whelming dominance of temporary jobs vis-à-vis permanent jobs in labor market ﬂows,
as well as a clear deterioration in the quality of new jobs. Now an even larger share of
the newly created jobs are temporary and these jobs last less than before the crisis. It
is important to take this aspect into account, because it is not clear a priori to what de-
gree relatively short-duration temporary jobs may help a long-term unemployed person
to restore their working career after several years in unemployment.9
Another relevant issue relates to the transitions into and out of nonparticipation.
The participation rates of prime age males are fairly constant during the crisis. Nonethe-
less, these net rates hide frequent movements into and out of nonparticipation. Figure
6 depicts absolute gross ﬂows to and from unemployment from 2005 to 2016. It is
apparent that the recession brought about a very large jump in absolute ﬂows between
employment and unemployment, but also that many people enter or leave nonpartici-
pation from one quarter to the next. These ﬂows are equivalent to at least one-third of
those between employment and unemployment. According to LFS deﬁnitions, workers
are considered to be employed if they have worked for at least one hour in the survey
reference week, unemployed if they are not employed, they have searched for a job
during the previous month, and they are also available to start work within two weeks,
9Nagore and van Soest (2016a) analyze the change in the behavior of labor market ﬂows during the
crisis using the Spanish Social Security data.
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Figure 7: Quarterly ﬂow rates into employment and unemployment in Spain, 2005Q3-
2016Q3 (%)
Note: Rates are computed with respect to the reference population in the preceding
quarter. Source: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa.
and nonparticipants otherwise. These deﬁnitions reveal that the dividing line between
unemployment and nonparticipation is quite permeable. People without a job who stop
searching for one quarter go from unemployment to nonparticipation, but if they look
for work again in the following quarters they will go through the reverse transition.
These transient ﬂows are frequent, indicating that nonparticipation is not necessarily
persistent, especially within this age bracket. Thus, as has been pointed out for the
US by Elsby et al. (2015), ﬂows involving nonparticipation can be a crucial element in
explaining the dynamics of unemployment.
In view of this ﬁnding –and also due to data limitations– in Section 4 we study the
transitions between nonemployment and employment. It is therefore worth checking
their cyclical behavior vis-à-vis the traditional ones involving unemployment rather
than nonemployment. These are represented in Figure 7, where the left panel depicts
the employment inﬂow rates and the right panel the employment outﬂow rates. It is
apparent that the transition rates from and to nonemployment follow similar patterns
as the traditional transition rates between employment and unemployment.
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4 What aﬀects the probability of entering and leaving
LTU?
This section presents our empirical results on the probability of entering and exiting
LTU. Our key goal is to estimate the impact of individual characteristics and dura-
tion dependence on the profile of the job-finding rates of the long-term unemployed.
Throughout the analysis we control for unobserved heterogeneity to avoid potential bias
due to selection on unobservables. We begin this section by explaining our empirical
approach, we then move on to describe the key characteristics of the sample, and we
end the section with a discussion of our main estimation results.
4.1 Empirical approach
We assume that individuals move between two mutually exclusive states, employment
and unemployment (or, more rigorously, nonemployment). Furthermore, in view of
the dual nature of the Spanish labor market, we distinguish between temporary and
permanent, or open-ended, employment. And, since we are interested in analyzing
the transitions between these labor states, our empirical model will consider the joint
estimation of the exit or hazard rates out of both employment and unemployment.
We specify these hazard rates using a discrete-time duration model (Jenkins 1995),
which are given by the following conditional probability:
h(t) = Pr(T = t | T   t)
where T is a discrete random variable denoting either employment or unemployment
duration. The hazard h(t) therefore measures the probability of a transition for a person
who has remained in the same state for exactly t periods. We also allow for multiple
destinations from each state, i.e. we employ a competing risks model for each state
(Lancaster 1990).
Our framework is similar to the one in Carrasco and García-Pérez (2015) and very
close to that in Rebollo and García-Pérez (2015). The hazard rate of unemployed
individuals depends on unemployment duration, t, and on a vector of variables x(t)
that includes a set of individual, sectoral, and aggregate variables described below. It
also depends on the person’s unemployment benefit entitlement, which is captured by
two variables. The first one is a dummy variable, b(t), that takes the value one when the
worker is receiving an unemployment subsidy in period t. The second one is a discrete
variable e(t) that captures the remaining months of entitlement for persons who are
eligible to contribution-based unemployment benefits and are receiving them. These
two benefits variables and some variables in x(t) are allowed to have heterogeneous
eﬀects over the unemployment spell through their time-varying coeﬃcients, ↵i(t), which
feature an interaction with log duration. In the case of e(t) this is modelled by allowing
↵3(t) to be a cubic polynomial in log duration.10 Accordingly, the unemployment hazard
10This is a departure from Rebollo and García-Pérez (2015), who assume linearity.
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rate has the following structure:
hju(t) = Pr(Tu = t | Tu   t, x(t), b(t), e(t), ⌘u) = F (↵j0(t)+↵j1(t)x(t)+↵j2(t)b(t)+↵j3(t)e(t)+⌘u)
where j = eT , eP denotes, respectively, the two alternative exits from unemployment,
i.e. employment with a temporary contract and with a permanent contract, as in Bover
and Gómez (2004). The last term in the formula captures time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity and is discussed below.
The exit from employment is also estimated using a competing risks model and all
coeﬃcients in these hazard rates are allowed to diﬀer between temporary and permanent
employees. The two competing risks for employed workers are moving to another job,
e, without going through unemployment, and moving to unemployment, u. Hence, the
employment hazard rate has the following specification:
hke(t) = Pr(Te = t | Te   t, x(t), ⌘e) = F ( k0(t) +  k1(t)x(t) + ⌘e)
where k = e, u. This hazard rate is simpler than the one in Rebollo and García-
Pérez (2015), where it also depends on previous receipt of unemployment benefits. The
variables in x(t) are the same as in the unemployment hazard.
Following Bover et al. (2002) and García-Perez and Muñoz-Bullón (2011), we use
a logistic distribution to model all hazard rates.11 Moreover, as we are considering
competing risks models for both employment and unemployment, exit from a given
state needs to be specified as a multinomial logit model with two alternative risks for
each state:
hu(t) = h
eT
u (t) + h
eP
u (t)
he(t) = h
e
e(t) + h
u
e (t)
Lastly, in order to avoid spurious duration dependence in the hazard rate generated
by the presence of unobserved factors (van den Berg 2001), we control for unobserved
heterogeneity aﬀecting the flows both to and from unemployment. This is captured
by the terms ⌘u and ⌘e in the expressions for the hazards. We exploit the fact that
we observe multiple spells for the same individual and we estimate the unemployment
and employment hazard rates simultaneously, assuming that unobserved heterogeneity
follows a discrete distribution function with diﬀerent mass points, as in Heckman and
Singer (1984). In particular, we allow a four-mass-point distribution function, namely
two diﬀerent points for each state, ⌘u1 and ⌘u2 for unemployment, and ⌘e1 and ⌘e2 for
employment, so that four diﬀerent types may emerge with joint probabilities, namely:
11We could have alternatively used the extreme value distribution. As explained in van den Berg
(2001), this distribution allows the model to verify the mixed proportional hazard assumption. Our
approach departs from the proportionality assumption, at the cost of imposing more structure, because
we want to allow the potential impact of duration and of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity
on the exit from employment and unemployment not to be proportional.
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(⌘u1 , ⌘e1), (⌘u1 , ⌘u2), (⌘u2 , ⌘e1), and (⌘u2 , ⌘e2). Standard errors for the estimated coeﬃcients
are computed using the delta method. The existence of repeated employment and
unemployment spells and, more importantly, of some time-varying covariates allows
non-parametric identification (Abbring and van den Berg 2004, Gaure et al. 2007).
Before presenting the results it is worth noting that our empirical approach only
yields reduced-form estimates, resulting from the interplay of labor demand and supply,
so that they do not have a causal interpretation. They are nevertheless informative on
the characteristics which are associated with a higher risk of LTU.
4.2 The sample and the set of control variables
Our initial data set is a 20% random sample of the prime age males aged 25 to 54
whose records appear in the nine waves of the Continuous Sample of Working Lives
(Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales or MCVL) corresponding to the years 2006-
2014. All individuals must have experienced at least one spell of nonemployment be-
tween 2001 and 2014. Individuals only appear in the records when they pay Social
Security contributions −roughly, if they are either employed or nonemployed and re-
ceiving unemployment benefits. No information about job search activity is available
in the data set, hence we cannot distinguish between unemployed and nonparticipating
individuals. Moreover, nonemployed individuals drop out of the records if they stop
receiving benefits. This is however not a problem, since the length of completed spells
of nonemployment can be reconstructed using the information on the subsequent job.
Furthermore, to exclude persistent nonparticipants, we limit nonemployment duration
to three years, after which spells are treated as censored. With this caveat in mind, as
already indicated, we take the license of referring to individuals without employment
as unemployed rather than nonemployed individuals.
Against this potential drawback, the MCVL data have crucial advantages vis-à-vis
the flow data from the LFS. They allow us to follow workers since the start of their
working careers –whereas the LFS only follows individuals for six quarters– and they
have a daily frequency, which permits the observation of all employment spells –while
many labor market transitions are missed in the LFS due to its quarterly frequency. We
can also construct a worker’s entitlement to benefits from the MCVL, whereas the LFS
only allows us to know whether the worker is receiving benefits or not. By contrast,
using this data source implies that we lose information on people living in the same
household as the unemployed worker, which is available in the LFS.
In order to avoid problems concerning attrition, we only analyze employment spells
in the general Social Security regime, thus excluding special regimes such as agriculture,
public employment, and self-employment, and treat exits from unemployment to these
states as right-censored (García-Pérez 2008). Moreover, in the case of workers who
are recalled to the same firm, a feature which has become increasingly important in
Spain (Arranz and García-Serrano 2014), we only consider intervening unemployment
spells lasting more than 30 days.12 Lastly, to maximize the probability of observing
12Accordingly, two employment spells with the same firm which have an intervening unemployment
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the individual’s complete work history, we exclude both immigrants and people who
appear for the first time in the sample being 30 years old or older (who may have an
unrecorded work history).
Our set of control variables includes both individual characteristics and aggregate
variables. The former comprise: (a) Age, grouped into three ten-year intervals. (b)
Education, measured by dummy variables for the highest degree attained.13 (c) Skill,
divided into high, medium, and low, computed from grouped Social Security tax cate-
gories.14 (d) Actual experience, measured by the number of months employed divided
by the number of months of potential experience (i.e. those elapsed since the per-
son entered the labor market). (e) A dummy that captures whether the worker was
fired from his previous job. And (f) our controls for benefit entitlement. As explained
before, entitlement to contributory benefits is measured by the remaining months of
entitlement in each month (Meyer 1990). The latter is computed from each individ-
ual’s employment and insurance claim history (since residual benefits not claimed in
one unemployment spell can be claimed in a later spell).15 This entitlement is entered
as a cubic polynomial in order to capture nonlinear eﬀects.
The aggregate variables included in the model are as follows: (a) Employment
growth, defined as the monthly growth rate of the number of employees by province.
(b) The quarterly national unemployment rate. (c) 17 region dummies. (d) 6 industry
dummies. (e) 12 monthly dummies. And (f) two step dummy variables for the labor
reforms in June 2010 and February 2012, that take the value one from those dates
onwards.
Finally, the following variables are interacted with log duration: age, education, skill,
unemployment insurance (linear and quadratic), unemployment assistance, employment
growth, national unemployment rate, and industry. In an extension we also interact
the type of contract (see below).
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the main characteristics of workers in the sample when they enter un-
employment, separately for the expansion (2001-2007) and the recession (2008-2014).
It should be stressed that they correspond to workers involved in inflows rather than
spell lasting less than 30 days are treated as a single employment spell.
13The data on educational attainment in the MCVL is oﬃcially revised using information from the
Spanish Continuous Census of Population (Padrón Continuo). It has however been improved since
2009 with data from the Ministry of Education, and so we use the latter information, imputing it
backwards (see De la Roca and Puga 2016, footnote 7).
14High skill includes college and junior college graduates, and top and middle managers (groups 1
to 6 in the Social Security classification), medium skill includes administrative assistants and so-called
first- and second-level oﬃcers (groups 7 and 8), and low skill includes third-level oﬃcers and unskilled
workers (groups 9 and 10), see García-Pérez (1997).
15Workers having access to two diﬀerent sets of benefit entitlements must choose between them.
We assume that they choose the one with the higher length. For more information see Rebollo and
García-Pérez (2015).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of worker characteristics, 2001-2014 (%)
Expansion Recession
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Age
25-34 years old 88.3 (32.2) 60.7 (48.8)
35-49 years old 10.7 (30.9) 35.6 (47.9)
45-54 years old 1.0 (10.1) 3.7 (19.0)
Education
Primary or less 11.9 (32.3) 13.5 (34.2)
Secondary, 1st stage 48.7 (50.0) 51.0 (50.0)
Secondary, 2nd stage 25.3 (43.5) 23.2 (42.2)
College 14.2 (34.9) 12.3 (32.8)
Skill
High 31.1 (46.3) 41.4 (49.3)
Low 24.7 (43.1) 11.6 (32.0)
Medium 44.2 (49.7) 47.0 (49.9)
Experience
Fraction of potential 76.9 (25.7) 77.3 (24.6)
Dismissal from previous job
Dismissed 80.8 (39.4) 91.5 (27.9)
Not dismised 19.2 (39.4) 8.5 (27.9)
Industry of previous job
Manufacturing 13.6 (34.2) 12.7 (33.3)
Construction 29.6 (45.7) 25.7 (43.7)
Non-market services 7.5 (26.3) 9.5 (29.3)
Trade 11.4 (31.7) 11.5 (31.8)
Hospitality 9.1 (28.8) 11.4 (31.8)
Other services 28.9 (45.3) 29.3 (45.5)
Unemployment benefits
Contributory 26.2 (44.0) 29.0 (45.4)
Assistance 17.7 (38.2) 35.6 (47.9)
No benefits 56.1 (49.6) 35.3 (47.8)
Previous job contract type
Permanent 16.4 (37.0) 20.3 (40.3)
Temporary 83.6 (37.0) 79.7 (40.3)
Number of spells 37,399 62,045
Note: The sample is made up of males aged 25-54 years old. The expansion corre-
sponds to the period 2001-2007 and the recession to 2008-2014. The characteristics
correspond to individuals in their first month in unemployment. Columns add up to
100 by characteristic.
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Table 4: Unemployment duration, benefit duration, and raw hazard rates
Expansion Recession
A. Unemployment duration (months)
Exit to a temporary job
Median 3.0 4.0
Third quartile 6.0 8.0
Mean 4.5 6.3
Share of spells (%) 76.6 69.9
Exit to a permanent job
Median 3.0 4.0
Third quartile 6.0 8.0
Mean 5.1 6.2
Share of spells (%) 7.9 8.1
Censored spells
Median 5.0 8.0
Third quartile 11.0 16.0
Mean 7.6 10.7
Share of spells (%) 15.5 22.0
B. Unemployment benefit duration (months)
All
Median 7.0 10.0
Mean 9.8 11.2
Temporary previous job
Median 6.0 8.0
Mean 8.9 10.0
Permanent previous job:
Median 16.0 20.0
Mean 15.6 16.8
C. Hazard rates out of unemployment (%)
Exit to a temporary job
No benefits 16.9 9.3
Contributory benefits 9.7 7.2
Assistance benefits 11.3 7.9
Exit to a permanent job
No benefits 1.6 1.0
Contributory benefits 1.3 1.2
Assistance benefits 1.2 0.7
Number of spells 37.399 62,045
Note: The sample is made up of males aged 25-54 years old. The expansion corresponds
to the period 2001-2007 and the recession to 2008-2014. Shares of spells add to 100 by
column.
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to worker stocks. The majority are younger than 35 years old, have completed at
most compulsory secondary education, and enter unemployment from a temporary job.
These facts confirm our previous remarks regarding Table 1, which is based on LFS
data. The education breakdown matches well the skill structure measured via occupa-
tions. In the expansion, close to one-half of the unemployed do not qualify for benefits.
There are sizeable changes in the composition of inflows from expansion to recession,
with workers becoming on average younger and less educated. They are also more likely
to have been dismissed (as quits fall) and to come from permanent jobs. Accordingly,
they are more likely to be entitled to unemployment benefits. The share of construction
workers falls, which is unexpected, but simply reflects a reduction in turnover in that
industry, given the scarcity of new jobs.16
Next, Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics of spells. The vast majority (91%)
of non-censored exits from unemployment are to temporary jobs, but the average length
is similar for spells ending in both types of contracts.17 Completed spells are quite
lengthy, around 5 months on average in the expansion and 6 months in the recession,
though –as shown for the third quartile– they are much lengthier in the upper part
of the distribution. Moreover, the recession is characterized by a strong rise in both
the share and the duration of censored spells. Average benefit entitlement periods last
10-11 months, but they are much smaller for workers coming from temporary jobs than
from permanent jobs, for whom the mean is around 17 months in the recession. Lastly,
average monthly hazard rates from unemployment to permanent jobs are around one-
tenth of those to temporary jobs and they are typically smaller for workers who receive
unemployment benefits.
4.4 Baseline empirical results
We now present our estimation results. In order to save space, we restrict our atten-
tion to the hazard of leaving unemployment (the estimates for the hazard of leaving
employment are reported in Bentolila et al. 2017).
4.4.1 Hazards
The hazard rate for the recession is shown in Figure 8. It corresponds to a hypothetical
individual with the average characteristics in our sample and it takes into account
all interactions between these characteristics and duration. The underlying estimated
coeﬃcients are reported in Appendix Table A.1.
The decay in the average hazard rate provides our best estimate of the magnitude of
duration dependence.18 During the first twelve months of unemployment the monthly
16According to the LFS, flows into construction from nonemployment were in 2014 equal to one-third
of the level in 2008.
17Overall, 18.4% of spells are censored, which correspond to true censoring (13.3%) and exit after
36 months (5.1%).
18The identification of duration dependence in hazard models remains a highly-debated topic, see
Machin and Manning (1999).
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Figure 8: Duration dependence in the baseline model and the model without unobserved
heterogeneity (%)
Note. Source: own computations.
hazard of the average individual drops by 55% or 9 pp –from 16.4% to 7.4%– and
it halves again during the second year. For comparison, the first figure is equal to
two-thirds of the diﬀerence between the hazard rates in the first month for an average
worker with no benefits and for one with a 12-month entitlement to contributory benefits
(which amounts to 13.5 pp). It is also equal to 47% of the diﬀerence between the former
hazard rate and the hazard rate for an average worker with a 24-month entitlement
(which amounts to 19.2 pp). Moreover, the impact of duration dependence is much
higher than the 5.6 pp diﬀerence implied by the movement from the 25th to the 75th
percentile in the distribution of actual work experience and the meager 2.8 pp diﬀerence
between the initial hazard rates of 25-34 year-old workers and 45-54 year-old ones.
Figure 8 also confirms the need to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Failure
to do so biases the estimation of duration dependence upwards, as indicated by the
steeper slope of the curve which depicts the average hazard for our baseline model in
that case (which now falls by 68%, from 18.3% to 5.8%, during the first year). The
estimates related to unobserved heterogeneity appear in Appendix Table A.2. While
their interpretation is not straightforward, it is still worth to briefly comment them.
According to our results, there are two prevailing types of workers: the (⌘uhigh, ⌘elow)
type, i.e. those with a strong labor-market attachment, who leave unemployment fast
and employment slowly (32% of the individuals in the expansion), and the (⌘ulow, ⌘elow)
type, i.e. those who leave both unemployment and employment slowly (50% of the
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individuals). The observed changes in the shares from the expansion to the recession
indicate that part of the increase in unemployment duration is due to a fall in the share
of fast unemployment leavers (by 13 pp) and an oﬀsetting increase in slow leavers,
especially among those with low exit rates from both unemployment and employment.
4.4.2 The predicted probability of entering LTU or VLTU
Both the initial hazard rate and the slope of the hazard function diﬀer across indi-
viduals. In order to assess the marginal impact of individual characteristics on the
probability that a workers enters LTU or VLTU, we report in Table 5 the survival rates
in unemployment at 12 and 24 months −i.e. the probability that an individual does not
manage to find a job during the first or second year of unemployment. Apart from the
average survival rates reported in the top row, these rates are constructed by varying
one characteristic at a time and setting all other characteristics to the values used to
construct the average hazard rates. Moreover, in order to construct the survival rates at
24 months we have rescaled the survival rate at 12 months to 100. It therefore measures
the conditional probability that an individual who is still unemployed after one year
remains unemployed during the subsequent 12 months.
Inspection of the table reveals that the chances of entering LTU have almost doubled
in recent years, as indicated by the rise in the survival rate at 12 months from 13.8% in
the expansion to 25.5% in the recession. The diﬃculty to escape LTU is captured by the
survival rate at 24 months. In the expansion two-thirds of the long-term unemployed
managed to leave unemployment in the next twelve months, but in the recession this
figure dropped to one-half. Hence the recent recession is characterized by a strong rise
in the inflow rate to LTU and a substantial drop in the outflow rate, leading to a higher
incidence and a stronger persistence of LTU.
In line with our previous results, we find that individuals over 45 years old are
especially prone to enter LTU, with estimated survival probabilities at 12 and 24 months
in the recession of, respectively, 35% and 63%. The vulnerability of these workers is
not a new situation, however, as the survival probabilities for this group were also quite
high in the expansion. Given our controls for other worker characteristics, this finding
points at structural problems for older workers in rebuilding their working careers after
job loss.
In the case of education we find surprisingly small and non-monotonic eﬀects. For
the expansion, we find a U-shaped pattern in the relation between education and the
survival rate. The individuals with at most mandatory education enjoy the lowest
survival rates while college graduates face the largest ones. The diﬀerence in survival
rates is around 8 percentage points. This counterintuitive result is likely due to the
relatively intensive growth of low-skilled jobs during the expansion, which was fueled
by the housing boom (Bonhomme and Hospido 2017). Indeed, for the recession period,
characterized by a steep drop in the demand for low-skill labor, the diﬀerences across
all educational attainment groups are much smaller. For example, the diﬀerence in
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Table 5: Survival rates in unemployment at 12 and 24 months (%)
Expansion Recession
12 months 24 months 12 months 24 months
Overall 13.8 33.2 25.5 51.3
Age
25-34 years old 13.3 32.2 23.7 48.9
35-44 years old 16.0 38.6 27.5 53.9
45-54 years old 27.5 49.8 34.9 62.9
Education
Primary or less 13.4 31.0 28.4 51.8
Secondary, 1st stage 11.2 27.7 24.2 47.1
Secondary, 2nd stage 14.7 32.0 26.6 50.8
College 19.6 35.9 27.6 50.7
Skill
High 14.9 36.0 26.0 52.6
Medium 12.5 31.6 23.4 49.0
Low 14.5 31.9 30.7 54.0
Experience
P75 10.7 28.3 18.5 43.4
P50 12.2 30.7 22.3 47.9
P25 16.2 36.6 30.8 56.5
P10 20.6 42.2 40.6 64.9
Industry
Manufacturing 12.3 30.0 23.7 47.3
Construction 11.8 31.8 23.6 48.3
Non-market services 18.4 39.7 30.9 58.3
Trade 14.8 30.6 27.7 50.2
Hospitality 12.3 27.5 22.1 46.8
Other services 14.7 36.2 25.7 54.7
Unemployment insurance
No benefits 5.7 19.9 12.1 36.0
6 months 13.0 19.9 20.6 36.0
12 months 35.0 19.9 41.9 36.0
18 months 45.3 30.9 52.6 46.9
24 months 53.3 56.1 60.7 65.6
Unemployment assistance
No 5.7 19.9 12.1 36.0
Yes 31.3 51.7 44.3 67.3
Business cycle
High growth 12.6 30.7 22.2 49.5
Low growth 15.2 35.8 28.4 52.6
Note: The sample is made up of males aged 25-54 years old. The expansion corresponds
to the period 2001-2007 and the recession to 2008-2014. The probability for the 24th
month is computed after resetting it to 100 at 12 months.
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the chances of becoming long-term unemployed between college and compulsory ed-
ucation graduates is reduced to 3 pp. The U-shaped relationship is also present for
our occupation-based measure of skill, with less skilled workers showing higher survival
rates in the recession. Apart from labor demand, another factor underlying this finding
could be that higher job opportunities for more skilled workers are hampered by their
higher reservation wages. On the other hand, in our companion estimation of employ-
ment hazards we do find that more educated and more skilled workers have significantly
longer employment durations (Bentolila et al. 2017).
Table 5 reveals that higher work experience does significantly reduce the chances of
becoming long-term unemployed. Moving from the 10th to the 75th percentile of the
distribution of actual work experience reduces the survival rate at 12 months by around
50% in both the expansion and the recession.
As expected, we find that workers from construction have the lowest survival rate
(at twelve months) in the expansion. What is somewhat more surprising is that they
still enjoy the second-lowest survival rates in the recession, despite the bursting of the
housing bubble. The explanation for this finding seems to be the comparatively high
degree of turnover in construction. Almost 60% of jobs in this industry last less than
3 months, compared to 44% for the other industries. Thus, short-duration temporary
contracts seem to act as an informal work-sharing arrangement, allowing a relatively
large share of unemployed construction workers to find work and thus avoid entering
LTU. The alternative explanation of a high degree of occupational mobility is not
supported by the data. Indeed, inspection of post-unemployment outcomes reveals
that unemployed construction workers are less likely to take up jobs in a diﬀerent
industry than workers from the other industries. And those who do mostly relocate to
non-knowledge intensive service industries (see Jansen et al. 2016 for details).19
At first blush these results may seem inconsistent with the fact that almost 20% of
the very long-term unemployed used to work in construction (see Table 2). However, it
should be recalled that this industry made up around 13% of total employment before
the crisis and, contrary to our initial descriptive analysis, we are now controling for
worker characteristics. The prevalence of high-school dropouts and other unfavorable
characteristics among construction workers shows up in low average exit rates, but
diﬀerences with other industries become much less hampering once we control for those
characteristics.
The largest adverse eﬀects on unemployment exit rates are associated with the re-
ceipt of unemployment benefits.20 As shown in Figure 9, during the recession a worker
19In connection with this issue, Lacuesta et al. (2012) downplay the implications of the employment
sectoral change for the job-finding chances of the unemployed in Spain. They argue that in spite of the
high degree of sectoral reallocation of employment stemming from the crisis, the degree of similarity
between the occupations that the unemployed had in their previous job and those of the employed
–or indeed of new vacancies– is high when compared with other European countries, and that this
similarity has not fallen much during the crisis.
20Large eﬀects of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration have been found in many
articles, like those cited regarding Spain in Section 2. Recent research has moved towards exploiting
natural experiments, see Moﬃt (2014) for an overview. For Spain, Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-
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Figure 9: Eﬀect of unemployment insurance (UI) on the survival rate in unemployment
Source: own computations.
with a 12-month entitlement to contributory benefits has an almost 42% chance of en-
tering LTU. By contrast, for a similar worker with no benefits this probability is 30 pp
lower. Analogously, conditional on having entered LTU, a 24-month benefit entitlement
raises the probability of entering VLTU by a further 30 pp vis-à-vis a comparable worker
without UI benefits (0.656–0.36), or 35 pp unconditionally (0.607⇥0.656–0.121⇥0.36).21
In terms of entry into LTU, the eﬀect for a worker without benefits of getting just a
6-month UI entitlement is larger than the eﬀect of the economy moving from expansion
to recession –namely, from 5.7% to 13% in the first column vs. going from the first
figure to 12.1% in the third column. And much higher diﬀerences are found for higher
entitlement lengths. The size of the change in the survival rate attached to unem-
ployment assistance benefits is similar. These diﬀerences in survival rates suggest that
workers with unemployment benefits either exert a relatively low search eﬀort and/or
have a high reservation wage. Then, when they step up their eﬀort to find a job upon
the upcoming expiry of their benefits, they are aﬀected by strong duration dependence,
and so at that point their chances of leaving unemployment are much lower than at the
start of their unemployment spell. In connection with this issue, in Section 5 we take
a look at self-reported reservation wages.
Planas (2016) have found a strong impact on the job-finding probability of the reduction in the benefit
replacement rate that took place in Spain in 2012.
21Note that the rates of survival to 24 months shown in the table are the same for all benefit
entitlements up to 12 months since, by construction, upon exhaustion of their benefits the monthly
hazard rate for workers with UI benefits converges to the hazard rate for workers without benefits.
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Figure 10: Eﬀect of the business cycle on the hazard rates by unemployment duration
Source: own computations.
In sum, we find that the probabilities of entering LTU and VLTU are quite large
and that they increased significantly in the recession. The determinants of both states
are quite similar and we obtain evidence of strong duration dependence. While individ-
ual characteristics like educational attainment and skill are not associated with large
changes in the rate of exit from unemployment, there are larger changes attached to
mature age, low experience, and receipt of unemployment benefits.22 The latter finding
points at the absence of active labor market policies.
4.4.3 The business cycle and unemployment duration
How does the cycle impact on hazard rates vary by workers’ unemployment duration?
To answer this question we have computed the average hazard rate in the recession in
two scenarios. The bad scenario is one in which provincial employment growth is set at
its first quartile and the national unemployment rate at its third quartile in this period
(-4.8% and 25.1%, respectively), while in the good scenario each variable is set at the
opposite quartile (third and first, with respective values of -0.4% and 18.6%).
As can be seen in Figure 10, the predicted hazard rates for unemployment durations
of 1, 12, and 24 months in the low-growth and the high- growth scenarios, respectively,
are: 14.5 vs. 18.6, 7.3 vs. 8.2, and 3.7 vs. 4.0. In other words, upon an improvement in
22Several of these results are common to Nagore and van Soest (2016b), who analyze unemployment
exits during the crisis using the same data source but diﬀerent samples and methods.
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the labor market, those who have been unemployed for one month leave 28.3% faster,
those unemployed for one year leave 12.3% faster, and those unemployed for 24 months
leave only 8.1% faster. These figures clearly illustrate that a cyclical upturn helps
the long-term unemployed very little, and it confirms the relative exit rates by duration
that were previously shown in Figure 5. Our estimates imply that growth alone will not
suﬃce to significantly push the long-term unemployed back into jobs and this entails a
substantial risk of a social and economic exclusion of these people unless eﬀective labor
market policies to reenfranchise them are implemented.
4.5 Alternative empirical specifications
Given the prevalence of temporary labor contracts in Spain, many of the jobs that
unemployed workers find are very short-term. We may therefore wonder what types of
workers mostly benefit from the availability of short-duration jobs and whether these
jobs act as stepping-stones to more stable employment. One way to look at this issue
is to treat exits from unemployment to employment spells that last less than 30 days
as right-censored rather than as standard exits.23 We can then examine the resulting
changes in the estimated coeﬃcients associated with worker characteristics, which we
again do through the lens of survival rates to 12 and 24 months in unemployment.
The full results are reported in Appendix Table A.3, while the most relevant changes
are presented in Table 6. By construction, the average survival rates turn out to be
larger than in the baseline, by 17.4 and 14.5 pp, respectively, for LTU and VLTU. But
the important point is that the eﬀect of ignoring short-duration employment spells varies
significantly across population groups. To see this, notice that the increase in the LTU
rate for college graduates is 6.7 pp less than for workers without secondary education.
Similarly, the survival rate in LTU for workers at the first decile of the distribution of
experience increases by 9.8 pp more than for those at the 75th percentile. Furthermore,
in this alternative specification the estimated survival rates at both 12 and 24 months
are monotonically decreasing in the educational attainment of the unemployed. These
results indicate that the somewhat counterintuitive U-shape pattern of the survival
rates in our baseline specification is a reflection of the rotation of relatively low-skilled
and inexperienced workers on short-duration contracts of less than a month.
One objective of future labor market reforms should be to improve access to stable
jobs, especially for workers at the bottom of the skill distribution. The latter may
require restrictions on the use of temporary contracts, but policymakers should take
into account that such a policy might have adverse eﬀects on the current long-term
unemployed. A short-duration temporary contract may be the only viable option after
years of unemployment and in some cases such spells may improve the subsequent job-
finding rates of the long-term unemployed. The latter issue is extremely important for
policy purposes, but an analysis of the causal impact of short-duration spells on the
subsequent job-finding rates of the long-term unemployed is left for future research, as
23We also adjust the estimation of the employment hazard accordingly.
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Table 6: Survival rates in unemployment at 12 and 24 months in the recession. Censored
model (%)
Survival rate Change vs. baseline
12 months 24 months 12 months 24 months
Overall 42.9 65.7 17.4 14.5
Education
Primary or less 47.6 67.8 19.2 16.0
Secondary, 1st st. 42.7 63.6 18.5 16.5
Secondary, 2nd stage 42.8 64.0 16.3 13.2
College 40.1 61.4 12.5 10.7
Experience
P75 31.4 56.0 13.0 12.6
P50 37.8 61.6 15.5 13.8
P25 50.7 71.6 19.9 15.1
P10 63.4 80.0 22.7 15.1
Unemployment insurance
No benefits 28.3 53.4 16.2 17.5
6 months 36.4 53.4 15.7 17.5
12 months 54.8 53.4 12.9 17.5
18 months 63.7 61.8 11.0 15.0
24 months 71.4 75.5 10.7 9.9
Unemployment assistance
No 28.3 53.4 16.2 17.5
Yes 59.5 76.6 15.1 9.3
Note: The sample is made up of males aged 25-54 years old. The recession corresponds
to the period 2008-2014. The probability for the 24th month is computed after resetting
it to 100 at 12 months. The last two columns report the change in the survival rate in
pp vis-à-vis the baseline estimates given in Table 5.
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it requires diﬀerent techniques.
Next, in an attempt to test the robustness of our results, we have also estimated an
alternative model that includes a control for the type of contract in the previous job
–temporary or permanent– and its interaction with the linear term of UI entitlement.
The objective is to minimize the possibility that our controls for benefit entitlements
capture unobserved individual traits that are not captured by our controls for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. For example, some workers may wish to reenter
unemployment periodically once they qualify for UI benefits. These persons may be
more inclined to accept temporary jobs and their propensity to exhaust their benefit
entitlements is likely to be relatively strong. The estimated eﬀects of specific worker
characteristics indeed diﬀer with respect to our baseline specification, but in terms
of the overall impact on entry to LTU or VLTU the estimates are very similar, both
qualitatively and quantitatively. The largest diﬀerence appears in the eﬀect of having
a 24-month entitlement to UI benefits on the survival rate at 12 months, which is 12
pp lower in this alternative specification.24
5 Reservation wages in the Great Recession
Given the reduced-form nature of our estimation, we cannot distinguish between de-
mand and supply factors. This raises the question of whether exit rates are low because
labor demand is low or because the long-term unemployed have too high reservation
wages. To answer this question we analyze the adjustment of self-reported reservation
wages during the recession.
The contents of this section are related to an ongoing debate on wage cyclicality
in Spain. Real wage rigidity is well-known to be high in Spain.25 Reentry wages
after unemployment have however fallen considerably during the crisis and this process
started as early as 2010. For example, for the prime-age males in our sample, the average
reentry real wage dropped by 15.3% between 2009 and 2014 (while it grew by 5.2%
between 2005 and 2009). This suggests a relatively strong adjustment in reservation
wages. However, the evolution of reentry wages depends on the composition of those
unemployed who regain employment and their decisions to accept job oﬀers. Moreover,
the diﬀerence between the reentry wages of the short- and long-term unemployed in
our sample is very small. This could point at the need for further reductions in the
24These results are available upon request.
25According to the estimates with MCVL data for 1987-2013 by Font et al. (2015), a 1 pp increase
in unemployment leads to a fall in real wages of -0.24 pp in the recession, and between -0.38 and -0.48
in the expansion. Real wage elasticity is found to be about 70% higher for job movers (see also De la
Roca 2014). Izquierdo and Puente (2015) suggest that there has been a structural change after the
2012 labor reform, which changed the regulation of wage bargaining (García-Pérez and Jansen 2015),
finding a 0.13 pp increase in the real wage elasticity for 2012Q3-2013Q4. Nonetheless, these elasticities
are small in comparison with the estimates above unity in Pissarides (2009) for the US and several
European countries. Moreover, the elasticity is countercyclical, i.e. the opposite of what would be
needed to stabilize employment.
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reservation wages of the latter, but it might also reflect the fact that only the best-
qualified long-term unemployed manage to find a job. For this reason, we pursue an
alternative route, by analyzing the behavior of self-reported reservation wages.
5.1 Self-reported reservation wages in the crisis
We use data from the Spanish Survey of Family Finances (Encuesta Financiera de las
Familias, EFF). This survey asks unemployed respondents the following question: “At
what gross monthly wage would you be willing to work?”. We keep only people who
report a positive nominal reservation wage up to 4,000 euros per month in any year.26
To avoid having people who exert little or no job search eﬀort, we exclude respondents
who report being unemployed for more than five years.
We pool together four waves, corresponding to years 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011. The
sample size is small, 2,816 observations, of which 1,538 are for men. The data constitute
an incomplete panel, with the panel dimension being rather small, since around 80% of
individuals are only observed once. For this reason, we estimate by pooling the data.
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table A.4. The average
monthly reservation wage is around 1,200 euros (at 2011 prices), the average duration
is high –2 years–, one-third of individuals are receiving unemployment insurance benefits
and 10% are getting unemployment assistance benefits. By household, average gross
real income is around 40,500 euros per year and average real net wealth is around
390,000 euros.
Our empirical specification is as follows:
log(!it) = ↵t +  log(Durit) +  UI it +  UAit +X
0
itµ+ uit
where subindex i denotes an individual, t is time, ↵t is a year fixed eﬀect, Dur is
unemployment duration measured in years, UI is an indicator for the receipt of un-
employment insurance benefits, UA is an indicator for the receipt of assistance unem-
ployment benefits, and X is a vector that contains the following variables: age, age
squared, marital status (single, married, unmarried partner, separated, divorced), edu-
cation (secondary first stage or less, secondary second stage, college), household-head
status, household size (number of members), annual household gross real income (in
the preceding year), real non-financial wealth, real financial wealth, and real debt. All
monetary variables are deflated, with 2011 as the base year. The EFF provides five
imputations for missing values in most variables. We estimate the wage equation with
each of the five data sets and then compute simple averages of the coeﬃcients and
corrected standard errors (Banco de España 2015). Standard errors are clustered at
the household level.
In view of the small sample size we report estimates for the total sample, including
a dummy variable for females, and then for males alone. The first column of Table
26There are only 11 observations above this threshold; keeping them slightly raises the estimated
elasticity to unemployment duration.
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Table 7: Reservation wages
Dependent variable: Log monthly reservation wage
All Males
Log duration -0.016 *** -0.020 **
(0.006) (0.008)
Contributory benefits 0.055 *** 0.021
(0.015) (0.020)
Assistance benefits 0.013 -0.022
(0.021) (0.029)
Age 0.004 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.159 ***
(0.013)
Married 0.059 *** 0.070 ***
(0.018) (0.026)
Unmarried partner 0.057 ** 0.107 ***
(0.028) (0.041)
Separated 0.033 0.011
(0.040) (0.055)
Divorced 0.076 * 0.054
(0.048) (0.062)
Household head -0.014 ** -0.011
(0.006) (0.007)
Secondary education, 2nd stage 0.031 ** 0.048 **
(0.014) (0.020)
College 0.070 *** 0.056 ***
(0.014) (0.018)
Household size 0.224 *** 0.194 ***
(0.022) (0.032)
Total income 0.014 ** 0.024 **
(0.007) (0.012)
Real assets 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Financial assets 0.013 *** 0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.003)
Debt 0.005 *** 0.005 **
(0.001) (0.002)
Observations 2,816 1,358
R2 0.251 0.262
Note: The specification includes also year dummy variables. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the household level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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7 shows that women have significantly lower reservation wages, but we should recall
that, on average, women also earn lower wages even after controling for observable
characteristics.
Reservation wages are higher for male workers who are older, more educated, and
married or cohabiting. They are also larger the higher are the household’s size and
income. Real assets are not significant, which may be the net outcome of a positive
wealth eﬀect and a negative lock-in eﬀect stemming from homeownership. Financial
assets, which are more liquid, do exert a positive impact on reservation wages, and
debt attracts a positive sign, so that it is not net wealth that matters. Receipt of
contributory benefits is significant for the full sample but not for males, and assistance
benefits are not significant for any sample.
An important coeﬃcient is the elasticity of the reservation wage to unemployment
duration, which is equal to –1.6% overall and –2.0% for males. These are very small
elasticities, which suggest that reservation wages do not respond very strongly to un-
employment duration. On the other hand, the profile of the coeﬃcient on the yearly
dummy variables, depicted in Figure 11, shows that declared reservation wages do in-
deed trace the business cycle. With respect to 2002, there are significant increases for
all workers in the boom years of 2005 and 2006 and large reductions in 2011 and 2012.
The pattern is even stronger for males, although it is estimated with less precision due
to the smaller number of observations. While, as already mentioned, male wages in
our MCVL sample fell by 15.3% from 2009 to 2014, average reported reservation wages
already show a reduction by 2008 and the cumulated fall by 2012 is equal to 16.8%.
Therefore, both figures are quite consistent with each other, suggesting that reservation
wages capture an important element in the wages received by workers who reentered
employment. In any case, such a large reduction in reservation wages forcefully suggests
the lack of room for much further adjustment in reservation wages.
Compared to the existing literature on self-reported reservation wages, we control
better for the financial situation of households. Our findings are at variance with the
results in Koenig et al. (2016), who use data on self-reported reservation wages in the
United Kingdom and Germany –from 1991 to 2009 and from 1984 to 2010, respectively–
and find low and borderline significant elasticities to the aggregate unemployment rate.
Outside the self-reported reservation wage literature, however, the strong and volatile
cyclical behavior, that we associate with our coeﬃcients on the time fixed eﬀects, is also
found by Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016), who compute, for the US from
1961 to 2012, the flow value of the opportunity cost of employment, dividing it into a
benefit component and the forgone value of nonworking time. While the first component
is small and countercyclical, the second one –which is closer to our measure, since we
are controling for the receipt of unemployment benefits– is procyclical and volatile over
the business cycle.
The low response of reservation wages to the receipt of unemployment benefits
has also been found by Krueger and Muller (2016). These authors collected a Survey
of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey, in 2009-2010, and cannot find a significant
relationship between reservation wages and benefits. Like in our sample, however,
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Source: own computations. Dashed lines represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 11: Annual proﬁle of reservation wages, deviations from 2002 (%)
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these wages are positively correlated with financial variables like severance payments
and savings. Lastly, our results partially diﬀer from those in Addison et al. (2009) using
data from the European Community Household Panel over 1994-1999. Only in 7 out
of 13 countries in their sample do self-reported reservation wages respond significantly
to the receipt of unemployment benefits, but Spain is one of them, with a significant
coeﬃcient of 0.092. However, their equation is less informative than ours, since it
only includes gender, schooling, age, and time fixed eﬀects as controls. On the other
hand, they do not find a significant elasticity of the reservation wage to unemployment
duration in most countries, but in the Spanish case it is significant and low, around
1%, which is smaller but close to our estimates.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the determinants of the buildup and the persistence of the exception-
ally high levels of LTU in Spain. Our empirical analysis indicates that mature age, low
experience, and entitlement to UI benefits are the main risk factors. Low educational
attaintment also raises the chances of entering LTU, especially if we mitigate the rele-
vance of spells of less than one month. Moreover, two of the most striking findings are
the relatively low risk of LTU for workers from construction and the pervasive impact
of negative duration dependence. The job-finding hazard of the average worker drops
by 55% during the first twelve months and halves again during the next twelve months.
These eﬀects are much larger in size than the cross-sectional diﬀerences in job-finding
rates across unemployed workers with the same duration. Lastly, over time the job-
finding rates become less responsive to improvements in the aggregate labor market
conditions.
Our estimates imply that growth alone will not be suﬃcient to significantly lift
the job-finding rates of the long-term unemployed. Moreover, the room for further
wage adjustments seems very limited due to the large observed fall in average reentry
wages that is matched by a strong decline in self-reported reservation wages. An overall
implication of our analysis is therefore that the current levels of LTU entail a substantial
risk of social and economic exclusion. Spain will have to step up its eﬀort to design
eﬀective active labor market policies that help to improve the employment prospects of
the long-term unemployed.
Our study oﬀers no clear prescriptions for the design of eﬃcient active labor market
policies for the long-term unemployed. Nonetheless, the recent meta-analysis of Card
et al. (2015a,b) indicates that these policies can make a significant contribution to the
reduction of unemployment and especially of LTU. Investments in training and hiring
incentives that are carefully targeted at the LTU deliver the best long-term results
while public employment programs tend to deliver the poorest results, but the impact
estimates vary considerably between diﬀerent studies. The appropriate design of the
programs is therefore key and the interventions ought to be tailored to the needs of each
participant. If these conditions are satisfied, the programs for the long-term unemployed
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are often both eﬀective and cost-eﬃcient (Csilag and Fertig 2015).
After a long period of inaction, Spanish policymakers are slowly recognising the
need to develop eﬀective tools to fight LTU. Following a recent recommendation of
the European Council, Spanish authorities have approved a three-year program –the
Programa de Acción Conjunta para Desempleados de Larga Duración– to oﬀer indi-
vidualized support to one million long-term unemployed people. This support involves
the assignment to a personal tutor and the preparation of an individual integration
agreement. However, this is nothing but the first step. Spain has a poor track record
in the field of active labor market policies and its public employment services are out-
dated and play at best a marginal role as intermediaries in the labour market (Jansen
2016a,b). These problems need to be addressed before we may expect positive results
from the recently announced plan.
Moreover, with a view to the future, it is crucial to intensify the early activation
of the unemployed. In particular, this is crucial for unemployed workers who receive
benefits, so that they do not reach spell durations at which, due to duration dependence,
low exit rates condemn them to enter and remain in long-term unemployment. As noted
in Jansen (2016b), the registered unemployed in 2015 had to wait on average nine
months before they received their first service from the public rmployment services
and around one-third was already in LTU at the time when they received it. Early
activation acts as a preventive tool that impedes the quick buildup of a large stock of
long-term unemployed.
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Appendix
A Additional empirical results
This Appendix provides additional empirical results on the exit rate from unemployment
and reservation wages.
A.1 Hazard rates and survival probabilities
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Table A.1: Estimates of the hazard of leaving unemployment
Expansion Recession
Exit to temporary Exit to permanent Exit to temporary Exit to permanent
contract contract contract contract
Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z
Age 35-44 years old -0.035 -0.89 0.180 2.05 -0.106 -4.69 0.232 4.36
Age 45-54 years old -0.586 -4.16 0.442 2.04 -0.295 -5.00 0.438 3.79
Age 35-44 y.o.⇥log Dur -0.064 -2.51 -0.038 -0.65 -0.018 -1.55 -0.135 -4.34
Age 45-54 y.o.⇥log Dur -0.006 -0.07 -0.127 -0.93 -0.067 -2.06 -0.210 -3.07
Secondary education, 1 st. 0.107 2.66 -0.033 -0.32 0.160 4.86 -0.185 -2.41
Secondary education, 2 st. -0.079 -1.75 -0.093 -0.82 0.103 2.72 -0.111 -1.31
College education -0.348 -6.64 -0.117 -0.92 -0.024 -0.53 0.101 1.05
Secondary ed 1 st.⇥log Dur 0.008 0.33 0.147 1.96 0.003 0.19 0.166 3.43
Secondary ed 2 st.⇥log Dur 0.004 0.14 0.172 2.17 -0.035 -1.83 0.180 3.45
College education⇥log Dur 0.018 0.60 0.191 2.25 -0.027 -1.16 0.193 3.33
High skill 0.093 2.64 0.224 2.67 0.273 7.38 0.015 0.18
Medium skill 0.187 6.29 -0.079 -0.98 0.347 10.11 -0.155 -1.92
High skill⇥log Dur -0.088 -4.09 0.020 0.37 -0.093 -5.01 0.173 3.48
Medium skill.⇥log Dur -0.071 -3.82 0.130 2.40 -0.071 -4.15 0.171 3.49
Dismissal 0.259 12.67 -0.004 -0.08 0.601 26.33 -0.469 -12.19
Experience 0.471 12.89 1.730 18.47 1.031 31.63 1.596 22.48
 Employment 2.405 3.37 -5.286 -3.06 4.142 14.25 2.904 3.78
 Employment⇥log Dur -0.663 -1.50 1.122 0.96 -0.711 -4.49 -0.002 0.00
Unemployment rate 0.010 1.19 -0.220 -14.25 -0.017 -5.63 -0.066 -10.51
Unempl. rate⇥log Dur -0.021 -3.63 0.053 4.13 0.006 4.94 0.019 6.57
Labor reform 2010 -0.072 -3.25 -0.073 -1.27
Labor reform 2012 0.009 0.51 0.158 3.47
log Dur -0.378 -4.43 -0.991 -5.21 -0.693 -13.77 -0.850 -7.06
(log Dur)2 0.255 6.22 -0.052 -0.47 0.337 11.37 -0.032 -0.39
(log Dur)3 -0.066 -7.28 0.000 -0.01 -0.104 -16.79 -0.029 -1.72
Unemployment insurance -0.436 -33.82 -0.381 -11.92 -0.380 -37.52 -0.157 -7.04
Unemployment insurance2 0.042 22.32 0.031 6.84 0.035 24.83 0.014 4.55
Unemployment insurance3 -0.001 -17.91 -0.001 -4.76 -0.001 -20.30 0.000 -3.80
U. insurance⇥log Dur -0.026 -3.55 -0.039 -2.51 -0.024 -4.95 -0.035 -3.28
U. insurance⇥(log Dur)2 0.006 1.63 0.021 2.80 0.009 3.95 0.009 1.85
U. assistance -1.083 -32.14 -1.086 -11.38 -1.107 -46.11 -1.287 -18.78
U. assistance⇥log Dur 0.036 1.44 0.111 1.63 0.030 1.96 0.187 4.29
No. of spells 37,399 62,045
No. of observations 1,346,016 1,641,889
Log likelihood -352,712.09 -446,462.87
Note: The sample is made up of males aged 25-54 years old. The expansion corresponds to the period
2001-2007 and the recession to 2008-2014.
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Table A.2: Unobserved heterogeneity estimates, 2001-2014
Males
Expansion Recession
Types Coeﬀ. z Coeﬀ. z
⌘u1 -2.19 -17.98 -1.83 -23.20
⌘u2 -0.96 -7.93 -3.17 -40.97
⌘e1 -2.68 -14.37 -3.59 -23.58
⌘e2 -1.73 -9.24 -2.59 -16.94
Probabilities
Pr(⌘uhigh, ⌘
e
low) 0.32 17.93 0.23 10.18
Pr(⌘uhigh, ⌘
e
high) 0.15 – 0.11 3.68
Pr(⌘ulow, ⌘
e
low) 0.50 30.48 0.58 –
Pr(⌘ulow, ⌘
e
high) 0.03 6.63 0.08 11.99
Note: The sample is made up of males aged 25-54 years old.
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Table A.3: Survival rates in unemployment at 12 and 24 months with censoring of short
jobs (%)
Expansion Recession
12 months 24 months 12 months 24 months
Overall 26.7 48.0 42.9 65.7
Age
25-34 years old 26.2 47.2 40.7 63.6
35-44 years old 28.4 52.0 45.3 68.0
45-54 years old 40.1 63.7 52.5 75.5
Education
Primary or less 27.5 47.8 47.6 67.8
Secondary, 1st st. 24.1 44.2 42.7 63.6
Secondary, 2nd stage 27.5 46.6 42.8 64.0
College 30.8 48.2 40.1 61.4
Skill
High 27.9 50.3 43.6 66.8
Medium 24.6 46.1 40.9 64.2
Low 28.4 48.0 46.8 67.1
Experience
P75 19.0 39.2 31.4 56.0
P50 22.6 43.5 37.8 61.6
P25 32.8 54.1 50.7 71.6
P10 43.1 63.4 63.4 80.0
Industry
Manufacturing 22.1 42.2 38.4 61.0
Construction 23.3 46.2 40.1 62.4
Non-market services 31.2 52.0 47.4 71.1
Trade 26.1 44.9 42.2 63.8
Hospitality 24.5 42.6 38.3 61.9
Other services 30.8 53.2 46.4 70.1
Unemployment insurance
No benefits 16.0 35.5 28.3 53.4
6 months 25.1 35.5 36.4 53.4
12 months 46.2 35.5 54.8 53.4
18 months 55.2 45.8 63.7 61.8
24 months 63.4 65.9 71.4 75.5
Unemployment assistance
No 16.0 35.5 28.3 53.4
Yes 43.8 62.1 59.5 76.6
Business cycle
High growth 24.6 44.6 39.2 64.1
Low growth 28.9 51.6 46.1 67.0
Note: The sample is made up of males aged 25-54 years old. The expansion corresponds
to the period 2001-2007 and the recession to 2008-2014. The probability for the 24th
month is computed after resetting it to 100 at 12 months.
42
A.2 Descriptive statistics of the reservation wage sample
43
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics for reservation wage sample
Mean Std. dev.
Reservation wage (monthly) 1,177.3 511.5
Unemployment duration 2.0 1.4
Contributory benefits 33.1 51.6
Assistance benefits 9.8 32.6
Age 36.6 13.8
Female 45.4 54.5
Single 50.4 54.8
Married 36.6 52.8
Unmarried partner 5.1 24.2
Separated 3.5 20.1
Divorced 3.3 19.4
Household head 35.5 52.4
Secondary education, 1st stage or less 45.8 54.6
Secondary education, 2nd stage 35.7 52.5
College 18.5 42.5
Household size 3.5 1.5
Total income 40,532.6 59,082.0
Real assets 350,236.4 1,613,022.5
Financial assets 77,356.3 700,874.5
Debt 38,007.4 360,404.6
Note: 2,816 observations. All variables are percentage shares except monetary variables,
which are in 2011 euros, age and unemployment duration which are in years, and
household size which is the number of members.
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